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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

WALLACE L. ROSANDER,
)
Plaintiff- Appellant~

~c~:7~o.

vs.

REX A. LARSEN,
Defendant-Respondent.

Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SAL'.r LAKE COUNTY

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff's amended complaint asserted liability in
the alternative on three causes of action:
(a) On the first cause of action that plaintiff was
a business invitee and sustained injuries as the result
of defendant's negligence;
(b) In the second cause of action that plaintiff
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was a licensee other than business invitee and that his
injuries were the proximate result of defendant's negligence;
(c) That the plaintiff was an employee of the
defendant and that defendant failed to provide Workmen's Compensation Insurance in plaintiff's behalf as
required by Section 35-1-46, Utah Code Annotated,
and that plaintiff was entitled to relief for his injuries
sustained as such employee pursuant to the provisions
of Section 35-1-57, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial judge required the plaintiff to elect
between the three causes of action. When plaintiff
elected to stand upon the third cause of action the
judge entered an order dismissing the complaint on the
ground that the plaintiff was not an employee of
defendant as a matter of law. Judgment was entered
dismissing the complaint without a hearing on the merits.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Appellant respectfully requests that upon
appeal the judgment of the District Court be reversed
and that the case be remanded for trial ·with instructions
to proceed to trial on the a~nended complaint, and that
no election of remedies be required until after satisfaction of judg1nent on one of the three alternative clain1s
for relief.
2
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff's original con1plaint asserted that he
was a business invitee of the defendant. He came into
a building being constructed by the defendant at Lot
1-:l! SPRING HAVEN SUBDIVISION in Salt
Lake County (R-1, para. 2 and 4). The plaintiff
asserted that the defendant was negligent "in failing
to cover a stairwell on the second story of the aforesaid
building, failing to provide a safe passageway for the
plaintiff, failing to notify plaintiff of dangerous and
unsafe conditions on the aforesaid premises which were
known to the defendant and his agents and employees,
or in the exercise of reasonable care could have been
ascertained by them, and failing to notify the plaintiff
of unsafe and dangerous conditions upon said premises."
Defendant's answer contains a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a cause of action, and denies any negligence. As an affirmative defense, defendant alleged
"That the plaintiff was an employee of defendant at
the time and place of said accident and was in the course
and scope of e1nployment at said time and that plaintiff's
recourse is limited to benefits, if any, under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act." (R. 6,
par. I.) Defendant also interposed the defense of contributory negligence and assumption of risk (Ibid. 2-3) .
In response to requests for admissions by the
defendant, plaintiff asserted that he was engaged in
working on the building at the time of the accident as
a subcontractor (R. 7, para. I (e) ) . It also appears in
the request for admissions and in the pre-trial conference
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held before Judge Stewart M. Hanson on April 26
that the plaintiff and his wife owned as joint tenants
the land known as Lot 24 SPRING HAVEN SUBDIVISION, and that plaintiff had entered into a
written contract with the defendant for the construction
of a dwelling on that property. Plaintiff was somewhat
experienced in the building business. He and the defendant had an oral agreement whereby the plaintiff could
employ a subcontractor in lieu of any subcontractor
employed by the defendant, or plaintiff could do a
certain part of the work and he would be credited with
any savings effected by work which he performed himself or the difference between the price given to the
defendant by plaintiff subcontractor and the subcontractor which otherwise would have been used by the
defendant (R. 7, 8, 13). At the time of the accident
in question, plaintiff was attempting to climb one of the
walls to assist in fastening the rafters. He reached for
a rafter to support himself. "Thile having the appearance of being fixed solidly in place, the rafter in question
was not fastened and as a result, plaintiff fell through
an open stairway and incurred the injuries of which
he complained (R. 13). Plaintiff asserted that the
defendant was negligent in failing to disclose the unsafe
condition or hidden defect and in failing to have a covering over the stairway and allowing the same to remain
open and in an unsafe condition (R. 14). At the original
pre-trial conference the trial court framed the following
Issues:
"1. What was the relationship between plaintifl' and defendant?
4
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2. If the relationship is and was that of a business invitee then was the defendant negligent'?

3. Was the plaintiff contributorily negligent?
4. Did the plaintiff assume the risk?
5. If the plaintiff is entitled to recover, what
da1nages is he entitled to?" (R. 14-15).

At the time of this pre-trial defendant also advised
the court that he wished to assert his first defense to
the effect that the complaint failed to state a claim for
relief. The parties were given leave to file briefs on that
1natter and the motion was taken under advisement.
On May 29, 1961, Judge Hanson filed a memorandum
decision entering a summary judgment for the defendant and vacating the trial date (R. 18). The judge
subsequently indicated that the motion for summary
judgment was granted upon the ground that "it was
the court's conclusion that at most plaintiff was an
employee of the defendant" and that in any event
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law (R. 24). Plaintiff moved the court for
an order to vacate the order granting summary judgment and granting leave to file an amended complaint.
This motion was granted on June 20, 1961 (R. 25, 30).
It does not appear from the record that any answer to
the amended complaint was ever filed. However, the
case came before Judge Ray VanCott, Jr. for pre-trial
on March 19, 1962 on the amended complaint. On
motion of the defendant, Judge Van Cott required
the plaintiff to make an election as to which of the three
causes of action he would stand upon. While objecting
5
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to the motion, plaintiff elected to stand upon the third
cause. At that point defendant's attorney moved to
dismiss the third cause of action. The court granted the
motion upon the grounds that the agreement between
the parties whereby plaintiff would have the right to
make savings in the building by finding subcontractors
to work at a lower rate on particular parts of the project,
or that plaintiff could perform parts of the work himself,
created a situation whereby "there is no duty owed to
this man by that defendant, and there is no showing
of any negligence on the part of the defendant" ( R. 33) .
It is important to observe that at no time was the
plaintiff offered any opportunity to make a showing
with respect to defendant's negligence or to file any
affidavits or otherwise present any facts with respect
to applicable customs or practices. Plaintiff was required
to elect between three legal theories without having any
opportunity to present the facts to the court or to have
any determination as to the inferences which may be
drawn from any of the relevant facts. The action of
Judge Van Cott was on the pleadings and prior pretrial order. The record contains an affidavit of the plaintiff to the effect that plaintiff's "presence on said premises had no connection with the fact that he was the
fee title owner of said prenuses, and his only object
in going to said premises was to do work on the home
pursuant to said contract . . . and he took no action
whatever to exercise control over said premises, which
control had theretofore been relinquished to defendant
Rex A. Larsen under a written contract dated August

6
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18, 1959, in which said defendant began the general
contract for the construction of a house on said premises
and assumed control over said premises" ( R. 16) .

ARGUJ.\f~~NT

POINT I.
THE COURT ER.RED IN REQUIRING
PLAINTIFF TO MAKE AN ELECTION AS
AMONG
THE
THREE
CAUSES
OF
ACTION IN I-IIS A.MENDED COMPLAINT.
Pursuant to an order of the court dated July 10,
1961 (R. 30) plaintiff filed an amended complaint in
three alternative causes of action. The first cause of
action alleged that plaintiff was a business invitee of
the defendant and that the plaintiff's injuries were the .
result of the defendant's negligence in "failing to cover
a stairwell on the second story of the . . . building,
failing to provide a safe passageway for the plaintiff,
(and) failing to notify plaintiff of dangerous and unsafe
conditions upon the said premises which were known
to the defendant and his agents and employees, or in the
exercise of reasonable care could have been ascertained
by them, and failing to notify the plaintiff of unsafe
and dangerous conditions." (R. 26.) The second cause
of action was on the theory that plaintiff was on the
premises with the permission and consent of the defendant and that defendant was negligent in failing to
notify the plaintiff of known defects. The third cause
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of action asserted that plaintiff was an employee of
defendant and that the defendant failed to carry W arkmen's Cmnpensation as required by Section 35-I-46 of
the Utah Code and that liability was predicated upon
the provisions of Section 35-I-57, U.C.A. I953. Over
the plaintiff's objections, the court granted defendant's
motion to require an election (R. 33). Requiring an
election at this stage of the case constituted prejudicial
error and was in direct violation of the provisions of
Rules 8 (a) and 8 (e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The pertinent provisions of Rule 8 are:
" (a) Clairns for Relief. A pleading which sets
forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim,
shall contain (I) a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief; and ( 2) a demand for judgment for the
relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief
in the alternati•oe or of several different types may
be demanded.

* * *
" (e) Pleading to be Concise and Direct; Consistency. (I) Each averment of a pleading shall
be simple, concise, and direct. No technical forrns
of pleading or motions are required.
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or· defense or in
separate counts or defenses. TVhen two or rnore
statements are rnade in the alternative and one
of them if 1nade independently would be sufficient~ the pleading is not rnade insufficient by the
insufficiency of one or more of the alternative

8
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state1nents. A party may also state as 1nany
separate claims or defenses as he has regardless
of consistency and whether based on legal or on
equitable grounds or on both. All statements
shall be made subject to the obligations set forth
in Rule 11."
The Utah cases have repeatedly held that the Utah
rules were to be applied substantially in the same manner and with the same affect as the substantially simliar
Feder~l rules. Blackham v. Snelgrove (1955) 3 Ut.
(2d) 157, 280 P. (2d) 453. Rule 8 (e) is applied by the
Utah Code in Hjorth v. Wittenburg (1952) 121 Ut.
324, 241 P. (2d) 907.
The common law background of Rule 8 and particularly 8 (e) is discussed at 2 Moore"' s Federal Practice_, Second Edition, paragraph 8.31, pg. 1702, 1703.
At page 1704 Professor 1.\'Iore says: "A pleading may
present alternative statements of the facts or alternative legal theories." Many examples are given at pages
1704 and 1705. A later collection of the cases in point
appears in the 1961 cumulative supplement for these
same sections.
Professor Moore points out that to require an election of causes of action would defeat the very purposes
which the rule was designed to correct. At Section 8.32
( pg. 1707 ibid) Professor Moore states :
"An alternative or hypothetical pleading by
its very nature is inconsistent. This, however, is
not a valid objection to it under Rule 8 (e) and
for good measure the rule goes on to provide that
a party may state separate claims for defenses

9
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regardless of the consistency and whether based
upon legal or equitable grounds or both. "\Vhether
or not a party pleads one claim alternatively or
hypothetically in a single count or pleads the
claim formally as separate claims in two or 1nore
counts is largely one of jurisdiction ... the consistency may lie either in the statement of the
facts or in the legal theories adopted, and the
party will not be required to elect upon which
theory he will proceed since this would defeat
the usual purpose of allowing inconsistent plearling."
Many cases under the federal rules have explicitly
held that no election is required of inconsistent causes
of action. A complete review of all of the cases decided
under Rule 8 (e) would unduly lengthen this brief.
Reference is made here to only a few illustrative cases.
In Senter v. B. F. Goodrich Co. (U.S. D. C. Colo.
1955) 127 F.S. 705, plaintiff claimed that the defendant
was liable on the theory of negligence in one cause of
action and in a second cause of action asserted liability
for breach of warranty on the sale of tires. The court
refused to require an election and entertain evidence
relevant to both issues. In its opinion the court said:
"A defendant cannot compel a plaintiff to
choose at his peril the theory upon ·which he
intends to rely and thereby possibly defeat a
recovery where two consistent, concurrent or
cumulative theories can be urged with prejudice
to the defendant's ability to defend. If an actionable wrong has taken· place recovery is to be
granted regardless of th~1ry and relief must not
be denied through the vehicle of a forced election."

10
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In notes 4 and 5 on the same page the court said:
"'Vhere remedies are not inconsistent, but are
alternative and concurrent, there is no bar until
one of them has been prosecuted to judgment,
unless plaintiff has gained an advantage or defendant has suffered a disadvantage. State v. Compton, Tex. Civ. App. 174, S.W. 2d 977, affirmed
1944, 142 Tex. 494, 179 S.W. 2d, 501. Also, cf.
Tallent v. ~.,ox, 1940, 24 Tenn. App. 96, 141
S.W. 2d 485, where court held that plaintiff in
suing for breach of warranty in original warrant,
based on delivery of diseased hogs which had been
represented to be sound, had not elected his
remedy so as to prohibit amending warrant by
adding counts for breach of contract, and fraud
and deceit, since counts added by amendment
were not repugnant or antagonistic. See also
De Hart v. Allen, 1942, 49 Ca. App. 2d, 639,
122 P. 2d 273, wherein the courf held that the
doctrine of election of remedies rests on the principle of estoppel, and there can be no estoppel
unless the two remedies are inconsistent and
repugnant, and unless unfair or unjust detriment
would result from the exercise of both.
"Even apart from the liberal spirit in1bued in
the federal rules the doctrine of election of remedies should be applied only to actions taken by
same litigant which are necessarily inconsistent,
and such doctrine being a severe one should generally, not be extended. Petillo v. Stein, 1945,
184 Md. 644, 42 A. 2d 67 5."
In Bernstein v. United States (CCA 10, 1958)
256 F (2d) 697 at 706, Judge Murrah, speaking for a
unanimous court, held:
"'·vhatever may be said for the common law

11
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doctrine of election of remedies before the advent
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we are
certain there is no room for its application under
applicable rules of procedure, according to which
every pleading is a simple, concise state1nent
of the operative facts on which relief can be
granted on any sustainable legal theory 'regardless of consistency, and whether based on legal
or on equitable grounds or on both'; Rule 8 (e)
(I) (2) F.R. Civ. P., and where the prayer or
demand for relief is no part of the claim and the
dilnensions of the lawsuit are measured by what
is proven. Western Machinery Co. v. Consolidated Uranium l\1ines 10 Cir., 247 F. 2d 685;
Gins v. Mauser Plumbing Supply Co., 2 Cir.,
148 F. 2d 974. When the complaint is judged in
the context of the philosophy of these ·modern
procedural concepts, we are convinced that the
election of remedies is inapplicable here."
The Fourth Circuit applied the same rule in Montgo,mery Ward v. Free1nan (CCA 4, 1952) 199 F.
(2d) 720.
Rule 8 has particular application in the case at
bar. At the first pre-trial conference held on April 26,
1961, Judge Stewart J\f. Hanson outlined the issues
as follows:
"I. V\That was the relationship between plain-

tiff and defendant?
"2. If the relationship js and was that of a
business invitee then was the defendant negligent?

"3. 'Vas the plaintiff contributorily negligent?
"4. Did the plaintiff assun1e the risk?

12
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"5. If the plaintiff is entitled to recover, what
damage is he entitled to?"

The court observed that the defendant had filed
a 1notion to dismiss the complaint and the court took the
motion under advisement (R. 15). Judge Hanson subsequently granted the motion to dismiss on the original
complaint concluding that "at most the plaintiff was an
employee of the defendant." It is to be observed that
Judge Hanson set aside his order dismissing the complaint expressly for the purpose o_f permitting the
plaintiff to file an amended complaint in alternative
causes of action (ibid). We have in this case the anomaly
of the first district judge who heard the case ruling
that the plantiff was an employee of defendant without
hearing the evidence, and then a second district judge
ruling that as a matter of law and without hearing the
evidence plaintiff was not an employee. It is submitted
that this is precisely the kind of a situation which Rule
8 (e) was supposed to remedy. Plaintiff has been denied
a hearing on the merits, not because either of th~ three
causes of action was insufficient in itself, but hecause
Judge Van Cott took it upon himself to rule first that
plaintiff had to elect at his peril as to whether he was
(a) a business invitee, or (b) simply a permissive occupant of the premises, or (c) whether he was an employee.
After having required an election, the judge then ruled
as a matter of law that plaintiff could not be an employee
thereby denying him an opportunity whatever to present
relevant facts to the court. It is submitted that Judge
VanCott's ruling in the case at bar is in direct opposition

13
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to the purpose and intent of Rule 8 (a) and 8 (e) and is
fiat contradiction of the leading authorities on the application of these rules.

POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE DEFENDANT O'VED TO THE
PLAINTIFF NO DUTY.
The plaintiff was on the premises in question in
one of three possible legal relationships to the defendant:
(a) He was a business invitee; or
(b) He was a licensee, or
(c) He was an en1ployee of defendant.
The liability predicated upon each of these various
causes of action was pleaded in the three alternative
causes of action. In Wimmer v. Bamberger R.R. Co.
et al. (1947) I l l Ut. 444, 182 P. (2d) 119, this court
adopted the definitions and distinctions of the Restate1nent on Torts between the liability of possessor of property to gratuitous licensees and business invitees. A
licensee is defined as "a person who is privileged to enter
or remain upon land by virtue of the possessor's consent,
whether given by invitation or permission. A gratuitous
licensee is defined as "any licensee other than a business
visitor as defined in Section 332." Gratuitous licensees
are persons "whose presence upon the the land is solely
for the licensees own purposes in which the possessor

14
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has no interest, either business or social, and to whom
the privilege of entering is extended as a mere favor by
express consent or by general or local custom." Restate1nent on Torts_, Sections 330-331. A business visitor is
"a person who is invited or permitted to enter or remain
on land in the possession of another for a purpose
directly or indirectly connected with business dealings
between the1n" (Ibid Section 332). In commenting upon
Yarious classes of business visitors, the editors of the
Restatement state in Comment (a) to Section 332:
"Thus, a delivery rnan of a provisions store,
while delivering goods to a residence is a business
visitor of the possessor thereof, so to is a workInan who comes to make alterations or repairs
on the land used for such purposes."
Comments (f) and (g) to Section 332 of the Restatement are as follows:
"f. Members of possessor's household. A Inember of the possessor's family, although ordinarily
a bare licensee (see Sec. 331, Comm~nt a), is a
business visitor if he pays board or gives other
valuable consideration for his residence upon the
possessor's land.
"g. Servants. A servant, whether an industrial
employee or a domestic servant, is a business
Yisitor. If he is an industrial employee, the purpose of his entry is directly connected with the
business which the possessor conducts upon the
land. If he is a domestic servant, he enters the
land for a business purpose of his own which
concerns the affairs of the possessor, in that it is
incidental to the possessors residential and social
use of the land.

15
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"The relation of master and servant has certain
peculiarities which have given to the servant a
smnewhat different degree of protection than
that which is given to other classes of business
visitors. . . ."
The distinction between the liability of possessors
of land to gratuitous licensees and business visitors is
discussed in Comment (a) to Section 343 of the Re-

statement:
"There is only one particular in which one who
holds his land open for the reception of business
visitors is under a greater duty in respect to its
physical condition than a possessor who holds his
land open to the visits of a gratuitous licensee.
The possessor has no financial interest in the
entry of a gratuitous licensee; and, therefore,
such a licensee is entitled to expect nothing more
than an honest disclosure of the dangers which
are known to the possessor. On the other hand,
the visit of a business visitor is or may be financially beneficial to the possessor. Such a Yisitor
is entitled to expect that the possessor will take
reasonable care to discover the actual condition
of the premises and either make them safe or
warn hin1 of dangerous conditions. As stated in
Section 342, a possessor owes to a bare licensee
only the duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose to hin1 dangerous defects which are kno"\\'11
to him and are likely to be undiscovered by the
licensee. Toward the business visitor, the possessor owes the additional duty to exercise reasonable care to make the land safe for the reception
of his visitor, or, at the least, to ascertain the
actual condition of the land so that by warning
the visitor thereon, he may give the visitor an
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opportunity to decide intelligently whether or
not to accept the invitation or permission.
In Wimmer v. Bamberger Co. et al.~ supra, this
court applied the Restatement distinction to hold that:
"A workman who goes upon the land to make alterations
or repairs is a business visitor." The court in that case
held that a carpenter employed by an independent contractor to insulate walls and ceilings of a railroad shop
was a business visitor and the railroad owed to him a
duty to exercise reasonable care to make the property
safe or to ascertain the actual condition of the property
and to warn the visitor.
If the plaintiff in the case at bar was only a gratuitous licensee, then the defendant owed a duty to exercise
reasonable care to disclose to him the dangerous condition_ of the rafter which was known to defendant and
likely to be undiscovered by the plaintiff. Such was the
theory of plaintiff's second cause of action. If the plaintiff was a business visitor, then he had an affirmative
duty to discover the actual condition of the premises
and either make them safe or warn the plaintiff of these
dangerous conditions.
The holding of the trial court that the defendant
"had no duty to the plaintiff" is palpably and obviously
erroneous.
The substance of the third cause of action was that
plaintiff was an employee of the defendant but that
defendant had failed and neglected to carry Workmen's
Compensation Insurance or otherwise satisfy the provi-
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sions of Section 35-1-46, U.C.A. 1953 with respect to
plaintiff. The Third cause of action was filed under
35-1-57, U.C.A. 1953 which provides in pertinent part
as follows:
"Employers who shall fail to comply with the
provisions of Section 35-1-46 ... shall be liable
in a civil action to their employees for damages
suffered by reason of personal mjuries arising
out of or in the course of employment caused
by the wrongful act, negligence or default of the
employer or any of the employer's officers, agents
or employees ... In any such action the defendant shall not avail himself of any of the following defenses: The defense of the fellow-servant
ruling, the defense of assumption of risk, or the
defense of contributory negligence. Proof of the
injury shall constitute prima facie evidence of
the negligence on the part of the employer and
the burden shall be upon the employer to show
freedom from negligence resulting in such in.
.Jury
... "
It does not appear from the record that the defendant
ever answered plaintiff's amended complaint. However,
in answer to the plaintiff's original complaint the defendant alleged as an affinnative defense "that plaintiff
was an employee of the defendant at the time and place
of said accident and was in the course and scope of his
employment at said time and that plaintiff's recourse
is limited to benefits, if any, under the provisions of the
'Vorkn1en's Compensation Act" (R. 6). Thus the
relationship of employer-employee is admitted by the
defendant. The application of Section 35-1-57 is patent.
Our statute provides that proof of the injury constitutes
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evidence of negligence on the part of the employer. The
burden is upon the employer to show freedom from
negligence and there appears to be no other defense.
\ Ve do not reach the question as to whether the "prima
facia evidence of negligence" provided by the statute is
procedural or substantive or is a "rebuttable presumption of law'' as was considered by the court in Buhler
Z'. Maddison (1949) 105 Ut. 39, 140 P. (2d) 933, subsequent opinions at 109 Ut. 245, 166 P. (2d) 205;
opinion on rehearing 109 Ut. 267, 176 P. (2d) 118.
Defendant offered no evidence to rebutt the presumption. The court ignored the defendant's own claim that
the plaintiff was an employee and entirely by-passed
the statute to enter judgment against the plaintiff without any opportunity whatever for a hearing on the
merits.
The rulings of the district judge in the case at bar
clearly and obviously deny plaintiff his day in court
on the 1nerits of his alternative pleading. Each of the
three causes of action viewed separately states a valid
claim for relief against the defendant. The arbitrary
dismissal of the complaint without any opportunity
whatever to present evidence in support of any of the
legal theories pleaded is a shocking abuse of judicial
power.

POINT III.
THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF WAS
A CO-OWNER OF THE PREMISES DOES
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NOT BAR RECOVER1:'" FOR DEFENDANT'S
NEGLIGENCE.
The record in this case is that plaintiff and his wife
were owners of the land upon which a dwelling was
being constructed "and that the defendant was in possessionof the dwelling as such as general contractor ... ''
( R. 7) . As one of the owners of the land plaintiff
entered into an agreement with defendant as general
contractor for the construction of the premises. The
defendant had made estimates as to costs of various
items involved in the construction. One of the provisions
of the agreement was in the event the plaintiff was able
to effect savings as to these various items by obtaining
another subcontractor at a lower amount than defendant's estimates or by plaintiff doing part of the work
himself, the amount of such savings was to be credited
to the plaintiff (R. 7, 8). This arrangement was noted
in the pre-trial order of .Judge Hanson dated April 26,
1961 (R. 13). The purpose of the plaintiff's visit to the
pre1nises on the date of the injury had nothing to do
with the fact that plaintiff was the owner of the premises
and the uncontradicted record in the case is that plaintiff
"took no action whatsoever to exercise control over such
premises, which control had theretofore been relinquished to defendant Rex A. Larsen under a written
contract dated August 18, 1958 in which said defendant
beca1ne the general contractor for the construction of
a house on said premises and assumed control over said
pre1nises." The plaintiff's business on the premises at
the time and place of the accident was either as a business
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invitee or a gratuitous licensee or an employee of the
defendant. Certainly the plaintiff was not a trespasser.
On any of the three theories pleaded in the plaintiff's
amended complaint, plaintiff was entitled as a minimurnJ
to present evidence on the question of negligence.
Even if it be conceded, however, for the purpose
of argument, that the plaintiff's interests as owner cannot be separated from any other business relationships
to the defendant, the fact that he is owner does not
absolve the defendant from any duty to exercise reasonable care toward the plaintiff in the same manner and
to the same degree that the defendant owes the same
duty to any other person. The Restatement of the law
of torts explicitly states that the liability to a business
invitee arises because of the possession of the property.
"A possessor of land is subject to a liability ... " according to Section 343 of the Restatement (emphasis supplied). And the comments to the Restatement clearly
establish that the reason for the rule is that the possessor
has within his control relevant conditions of safety upon
the property. Who has a more legitimate interest in
visiting premises where construction is under way by a
general contractor than the owner of the premises ?
Suppose Mr. A as owner enters into a contract with
Mr. B for the construction of a dwelling, the contract
specifying the quality of material, size of rooms and
various and sundry other matters concerning the com·
pletion of the unit. The contractor obviously has complete control over the condition of the premises during
the time of construction but the owner certainly would
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be entitled to enter upon the premises at reasonable
times to determine whether the contract was being
completed in accordance with the applicable specifications. Suppose the contractor negligently leaves a thin
piece of sheeting across an area· in the floor where the
owner might be expected to pass upon his inspection
tour, and upon such a visit the owner steps upon the
sheeting, breaking it with his feet and is injured in the
resulting fall. Would anyone contend that the owner
was not a business invitee within the rule and allow
recovery against the contractor? Such was Negra v. L.
Lion and Sons Co. (Cal. Ct. App. 1951) 227 P (2d)
916 where it was expressly held that negligence of the
contractor or his employees gives rise to a cause of
action for personal injury to the owner of the premises.
The reason for the contractor's liability is that he has
supervision and control over the entire building during
its construction and where he negligently creates a condition he is primarily responsible for the consequences
which follow. Pastorelli v. Associated Employer, Inc.
(D.C.R.I. 1959) 176 F.Supp. 158; Smith v. Wilson
(1958) 325 P (2d) 421. Section 387 of the Restate1nent
on Torts explicitly states:
"An independent contractor or servant to
whom the owner or possessor of land turns over
the entire charge thereof is subject to the same
liability for harm caused to others within or outside the land by his failure to exercise reasonable
care to n1aintain the land in safe repair as though
he were the possessor of the land."
The fact that the plaintiff had the right to go on
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the pren1ises and perform certain work upon the building does not mean that the contractor in charge of the
premises owes no duty of reasonable care to him. It is
well settled that a subcontractor is a business invitee
of the contractor. In Dingman v. A. F. Mattock Co.
(Sup. Ct. Cal., 1940) 15 Cal (2d) 622, 104 P (2d) 26,
the subcontractor was injured when scantling which
had been placed across an open stairwell broke as the
subcontractor attempted to assent from one level to
another. It was held that the subcontractor was a business invitee of the general contractor where he was
required to enter the very part of the building where the
accident occurred.

J(UPTZ v. Ralph Sollitt ~Sons Construction Co.
(CCA 5, 1937) 88 F (2d) 532, cert. den. 302 U.S. 696,
82 L.Ed. 537, 58 S. Ct. 14 holds that an electrical subcontractor's fore1nan was an invitee and the general
building contractor owed a duty to keep the premises
in safe condition. Mecham v. Gor·don 307 Mass. 59, 28
N.E. (2d) 759 holds that an employee of the owner of
the premises may recover on the business invitee theory
against a general contractor installing a vault and door.
In Glenn v. Gibbons x Reed Company (1954)
(2d) 1013, this court held
that the bailor of a large shovel was in the position of a
business invitee UJ20n property in the control of a contractor. The court said:
1 Ut. (2d) 308, 265 P

"We need not delve into the difficult questions
involved in an implied invitation, for here Newman received an express invitation to go upon the
23
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land of the defendant by virtue of his contract
with the defendant to shovel gravel for their
mutual business advantage. Therefore N ewn1an
was a business invitee upon the property and the
company owed him the duty of conducting its
known dangerous activities with reasonable care
for his safety. Restatement of Torts, Sec. 346.
This, of course, is equally applicable to the
equipment which he brought ~pon the land in
furtherance of his contract with the defendant.'~

In Donahoo v. l(ress House Moving Corporatio-n
(1944) 147 P (2d) 637; subsequent opinion (1944)
153 P ( 2d) 349, 25 Cal. ( 2d) 237, the plaintiffs were
occupants of the premises in question as tenants. A
house moving contractor permitted them to live in the
house and to remain on the premises during the removal
of the house to the rear of the lot. The court held that
the defendant owed to the plaintiffs a duty as invitees
and was required to provide reasonably safe passageway
for ingress and egress to and from the house and guard
openings or evacuation made by the defendants as contractors on the premises. The theory of the case was
that the plaintiffs were agents of the owners and as such
the defendants owed a duty to them as business invitees.

The authorities clearly establish the proposition
that a contractor owes a duty of care to the owner of the
pre1nises on the same theory upon which the duty arises
in other instances where the business invitee doctrine is
applicable. No case has been found where a court ruled
that the owner of premises ·which were in the possession
of a general contractor was deprived of his cause of

24
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

action against the contractor simply because he was
owner. It is certainly possible that in a given instance
a person who owned a particular piece of property
upon which construction work was in progress could
be an employee of the contractor. In that event there
is no reason why the ordinary legal relations between
employers and employees would not be applicable between the persons involved insofar as employment
relationships were concerned. In the c.ase at bar, insofar
as the district court's ruling denied plaintiff's recovery
because of his co-ownership in the property, it was
grossly erroneous.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The amended complaint stated three alternative
legal theories upon which liability could be predicated.
Each one of these theories was sufficient in and of itself
upon which to base a judgment against the defendant.
The court erred in requiri~g the plaintiff to elect one
of the theories to the exclusion of the others prior to
a hearing on the merits. The court erred further in
determining that no judgment could be predicated on
the third cause of action. The judgment of the district
court should be reversed with instructions to proceed
to trial and submit the case to the jury upon all three
causes of action. If the jury should return a verdict
for the plaintiff upon all three causes of action, then,
of course, satisfaction of the judgment on one of the
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causes would act as a bar to enforcement on the other
two. Until the facts are determined, however, there is
no occasion to require the plaintiff to make an election.
Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE M. McMILLAN
1020 Kearns Bldg.

Salt Lake City, Utah
.Attorney for Plaintiff-.Appellant
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